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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-64 350.05/38(DOCI)(C)(25 Jan 52) 25 January 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information.

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the attached EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces and the Service Schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded, with Department of the Army approval, to information addressees for use at the headquarters of the installation or activity concerned to keep them informed concerning theatre problems from front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Generally, the EXTRACTS which pertain to training appear under the classification of RESTRICTED. For combat information of training value at the Company-Battery level, addressees are referred to Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS, which are also published under the classification of RESTRICTED.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

W H Melhorn

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
229 thru 249

W. H. MELHORN
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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ATTNG-64 350.05/38(DOCI)(C)(25 Jan 52) 25 January 1952
Subject: Dissemination of Combat Information

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: 2d Inf Div After-Action Conference

DATE: 2 November 1951 Source No. 229

PLANNING TIME FOR ATTACK

The time needed to complete plans for a new attack should be at least two (2) and preferably three (3) days. Three (3) hours are needed to register artillery if no forward displacement is involved. The principal time-consuming problem is hauling ammunition to the site in sufficient quantities for both preparatory fires and for stockpiling against the contingency of a counterattack. Proper reconnaissance by a Company Commander requires at least one day. Where possible, it is desirable for Company Commanders to reconnoiter by air in addition to making their map and ground reconnaissance. This takes an additional half day. (RESTRICTED)

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FIRE SUPPORT TEAMS

A typical fire support team consisted of three (3) groups of weapons: 75-mm recoilless rifles, .50 caliber machine guns and 81-mm mortars. There were usually six (6), sometimes eight (8) weapons in each group. Groups were tied into a Fire Direction Center by wire and radio. One officer was placed in charge of each group, and officers or non-commissioned observers were placed with the assaulting battalions. Fire requests were phoned or radioed to the FDC, which determined priority of fires and assigned missions to one or more groups. Emplacement sites for these groups were predetermined and stockpiling of ammunition was begun well in advance of the attack. (RESTRICTED)

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PREPARATORY FIRES

Preparatory fires proved highly profitable, particularly where the time of attack was varied. Converged sheaf firing is recommended

INCLOSURE

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[redacted]

OCAFF Form No 73
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

as the usual pattern in this terrain, otherwise much of the fire is wasted. However, artillery fire patterns must be varied if maximum casualties are to be inflicted on the enemy. Slack periods of friendly artillery fire usually occurred at meal times, just after dark, and before dawn; consequently the enemy moved around at these times, affording us a good chance to catch him in the open. Difficulty was experienced in accuracy of firing when registrations were made the day before an attack. It follows that artillery should be registered, preferably by individual battery, on the day of the attack. Aside from loss in accuracy, premature registration has "telegraphed the punch" on several occasions and allowed the enemy to reinforce his positions. (RESTRICTED)

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INFANTRY FOLLOW-UP OF ARTILLERY FIRE

Terrain has usually dictated how closely assault elements can follow artillery fires. In some instances troops have followed artillery fire by one hundred yards; in others, where vertical distance was involved, troops followed the fire by many times this distance. Precipitous terrain generally prohibits close follow-up of supporting artillery. Where this happens troops may move under the cover of an air strike, or under recoilless and automatic weapons fire. (RESTRICTED)

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NIGHT ATTACK

The successful night attack has certain requirements: (1) a simple plan; (2) a single objective; and (3) a thorough reconnaissance. Greatest success was experienced where men were mentally conditioned. This conditioning was achieved as a by-product of making detailed preparations for the attack. Orders should be received at least the night before and preferably several days before the attack. In one instance, to aid control, the route was marked by luminous markers placed by patrols prior to the attack. This proved highly successful. In other cases the attacking forces used the well-known technique of wearing white arm bands for easy identification. Streams, ridge lines and other features which were readily distinguishable were selected as phase lines. The formation used was invariably the file. Because lack of observation reduced safety to our own troops and because it involved sacrificing surprise,

preparatory fires were usually not used on night attacks. It was found that the best timed attacks were those which placed friendly forces on the objective just at dawn, thus eliminating the opportunity for the enemy to regroup under cover of darkness for a counter-attack. The usual means of communication was radio. It was agreed that some light is preferable to complete darkness; when there was no moon indirect searchlight illumination was used. The use of flares in a night attack is not recommended as the enemy uses them extensively and confusion results. (RESTRICTED)

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REDUCTION OF ENEMY BUNKERS

Generally, the weapons used in reduction of bunkers depend largely on the type of construction of the fortification and the availability of the desired weapon. Recoilless rifles were found to be quite effective against bunkers carved out of rock. Hand grenades, rifle grenades, and phosphorous grenades were particularly effective against log bunkers. The flame thrower has a great psychological effect on the enemy, but bulk and weight of this weapon make it unwieldy for use in steep terrain. The 105-mm and 155-mm Howitzers and five hundred (500) pound aerial bombs proved to be very effective. Counter to experience in the European campaign, the enemy did not relinquish adjacent positions when it became tactically disadvantageous to remain. Pre-planning the reduction of bunkers paid dividends. It assured teamwork rather than relying solely on the spontaneous inspiration of the individual. Where time permits, rehearsals prior to the attack are believed to be highly beneficial. (RESTRICTED)

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ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE

The main problem in organization of defensive positions was one of logistical support. Sectors of fire were properly designated. Wire was usually placed at night and installed correctly, employing protective fire. Range cards and aiming stakes were used, though not as extensivley as they should be. Range cards for 81-mm Mortars were affixed to the mortar tubes so that planned concentrations could be fired. Close supervision was needed in clearing fields of fire and in building fortifications. Although communications were normally adequate, a signal plan for the use of pyrotechnics

should be established in case of emergency. The fire power of the M-16 materially aided the Infantry in defensive roles and proved to be very satisfactory whenever the M-16's were suitably located. Tanks were best employed on the defense by assigning them a wide valley. Tank firing should have been restricted to direct fire missions, as indirect firing proved unsatisfactory. Contact points should have been designated by higher headquarters rather than allowing units concerned to pick them. Improved minefield doctrine and proper reporting and plotting of mine installations should materially reduce friendly casualties. It was recommended that flamethrowers be installed in defensive positions in the future to reduce an assault on the position. (RESTRICTED)

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EMPLOYMENT OF PATROLS

Broad missions should be assigned, leaving details of the patrols to the unit given the mission. If the intent is to occupy the ground patrolled and if no enemy are on the position, the patrol should be reinforced quickly by enough personnel to defend adequately. The enemy will quite often move in and occupy an area which has been patrolled but not occupied by friendly forces simply because he realizes it is important to us. Patrols repeated to the same location or over the same route very quickly result in ambushes. Night patrol missions should be assigned at least twenty four (24) hours in advance if planning is to result. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Engr C Bn

DATE: February 1951 Source No. 230

SIGNAL

The shortage of telephone wire and the short range of the present radios with which the battalion is now equipped present problems in communications. This battalion recommends that radios with longer range be added to the Engineer T/O&E. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div Arty

DATE: May 1951 Source No. 231

ATTACHMENT OF SEARCHLIGHT UNITS

Battlefield illumination with searchlights continued during day with considerable success in all except the worst weather conditions. It is recommended that either a platoon of searchlights be made organic to Division artillery or that an Engineer Searchlight Company be attached to the Corps Artillery. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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EMPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM AND HEAVY ARTILLERY

Availability of long range heavy artillery provided greatly desired and needed depth to the battlefield, both on the offense and the defense. To some extent the employment of heavy artillery compensated for the inadequate roadnet of KOREA. It was necessary, however, due to the limited amount available and the still relatively broad Division and Corps fronts, to employ medium artillery in forward areas, in one case in front of the infantry, to cover daytime patrols. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn RCT - Medical Company

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 232

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Helicopters render superior service in patient evacuation and plans should be made to increase the number of this type aircraft.

2. All airborne operations behind enemy lines should include a surgical team for emergency operations.

3. There must be a full briefing of Battalion Surgeons on the tactical situation and plans for operations.

4. ROK's should be attached, if possible, in company size strength to be utilized as litter bearers. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Bn - 187th Abn RCT

DATE: May 1951 Source No. 233

HIGH GROUND

Action on this date indicated clearly that units must investigate all high terrain features within their assigned areas. If this type terrain is bypassed completely on approach to final objective, the rear and flanks of the unit and adjacent units are extremely jeopardized. (RESTRICTED)

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ADVANCE GUARD AND COVERING FORCE COORDINATION

Difficulty was experienced by the Advance Guard Commander in learning the situation of the Covering Force. The Covering Force Commander was responsible directly to the Task Force Commander, not the Advance Guard Commander, and his communications were governed accordingly.

The big weakness of this plan was the inability of the Advance Guard Commander to know the situation and requirements of the Covering Force Commander in sufficient time to be of the utmost assistance to him.

Recommend that in future operations the Covering Force Commander be directly responsible to the Advance Guard Commander who in turn is responsible to the Task Force Commander. This method would give the Advance Guard Commander a greater latitude of action, permitting him to commit his forces much more expeditiously to assist the Covering Force and in turn carry out his own mission of securing the uninterrupted march of the main body.

SP artillery, which was an integral part of the Covering Force, could not be placed in action due to the intense small arms fire being received from enemy forces. In addition, these guns blocked the road making it impossible to expedite ammunition resupply and evacuation of wounded personnel by vehicle. Towed howitzers were a part of the Advance Guard. Due to the nature of the terrain it was impossible to place these guns in a firing position to be of assistance to the Covering Force as quickly as was desirable. This, plus the previously mentioned deficiency of command channels, denied use of artillery to the Covering Forces for a prolonged period of time.

Recommend that in a Task Force of this type, all artillery be eliminated from the Covering Force and SP artillery be used as part of the Advance Guard. Tank fire can be used for direct fire with the Covering Force. From the position in the column with the Advance Guard, the artillery will be free from enemy small arms fire. Utilizing SP guns, they can go quickly into action and furnish maximum artillery support to the Covering Force with a minimum of delay, particularly if the Covering Force is under the command of the Advance Guard Commander. If close-in artillery support is necessary to assist an advance guard too closely engaged for use of their own artillery, this fire can be given by the artillery with the Main Body. (RESTRICTED)

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ARTILLERY FIRE MASKED BY PLANES

The Battalion Commander again asked for the artillery. He was told that he could not get artillery because fire was masked by planes in the area. (RESTRICTED)

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CONTROL OF ARTILLERY FIRE

Artillery support was received by "L" Company at approximately 1900 hours and was very effective. During this action, a Forward Observer with the tanks cancelled the artillery fire supporting "L" Company by instructing the FDC that the artillery was landing too close to friendly ground troops ("L" Co). Actually, this fire was landing very accurately in the area desired by the Commanding Officer of Company "L".

It must be emphasized that the calling in or cancelling of supporting fires is a command function and responsibility. A Forward Observer is purely an advisor, even when attached to a command. But a Forward Observer not assigned or attached directly to a unit should never take it upon himself to interfere with missions being fired for the unit. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 138th AAA Gp - Annex 6, Appendix 1

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 234

COMMUNICATIONS

Difficulty was encountered in radio communication with surveillance radar sites. The transmitters at these sites have a rated power output of 40 watts. Tests were conducted with various types of antennae to determine the most suitable type for 24-hour operation. Distances range from twenty-two (22) to forty-seven (47) miles. A half-wave, two (2) wire, folded doublet type, fed by a 200 ohm coaxial transmission line, was found to provide satisfactory radiotelephone communication between the Antiaircraft Operations Room and these sites. This type of antenna will be installed at each surveillance radar site. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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POWER GENERATOR

A staff study was prepared on electrical power for tactical equipment. It was recommended that diesel driven generators, Model RD-14A, be authorized for issue on a basis of one per 120-mm gun battery. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Inf Div Arty

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 235

EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS AS ARTILLERY

Over a period 1 March through 9 March 1951, two (2) platoons of tanks were trained to the extent that on 7 March through 9 March they were used as artillery in support of 25th Infantry in their crossing of the Han River. One platoon of only four (4) guns fired 840 rounds in two (2) hours fifty (50) minutes for a rate of fire of 1.25 rounds per minute. For the above three (3) day operation approximately 1500 rounds were fired. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 9th Inf Regt

DATE: May 1951 Source No. 236

PATROL OPERATIONS

1. Patrols must utilize high ground despite the physical effort and the slowness of progress. If low ground, valleys, villages, road junctions, etc, are to be searched, adequate security must be maintained on the high ground overlooking these features.

2. Artillery FO parties and the Battalion TAP must accompany the patrol. In this regiment it is often necessary for these groups to establish relay stations in order to insure continuous communication with the controlling agency.

3. Upon contacting and locating the enemy, it is usually far more advantageous to fall back to cover positions and make maximum use of supporting artillery and mortars than to remain in a small arms engagement.

4. Patrols must know channel and call signs of all adjacent units. Repeatedly patrols have had to rely on alternate means of communication to their base. It is feasible and highly desirable to extend wire lines on company size patrols. The SCR 619 is better suited for patrol action than the SCR 610, since the patrol need not stop and set up the radio for communication.

5. It must be kept in mind that Company size patrols are bulky and often times difficult to control. In many cases most Battalion and Company Commanders would prefer to utilize smaller groups, feeling that they can accomplish the same results. (RESTRICTED)

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PREPARATION OF DEFENSIVE LINES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS

The basic concepts and principles of our doctrine, when employed in the preparation of defensive lines and field fortifications, have been proved sound. Properly applied, they have, in most instances, guaranteed the retention of any ground. (RESTRICTED)

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ASSAULT OF FIXED POSITIONS

1. It has again been found that personnel and units will not follow closely their supporting fires. Too often there is a time

lag between the artillery concentrations and the actual assault. This likewise has held true with tactical air support.

2. One Battalion has successfully utilized "dry runs" by supporting aircraft to cover their assault. After the planes have made their strike the ground controller has the flight continue to make runs on the objective while the troops advance. This same unit has utilized .50 caliber machine guns in support of the attacking units. This has been in lieu of the 75-mm recoilless rifle which has limitation in this type of terrain.

3. Close liaison must be effected and maintained between the TACP and the artillery liaison officer. This unit has found that the best solution is to have both parties, with their communication equipment, at the regimental CP or forward CP. At this location the regimental CO and S-3 can request and control both air and artillery support.

4. Direct support (.50 caliber and 76-mm fires) by organic and attached tank units was found to be extremely effective. The commander of the leading echelon had direct communication (SCR 300) with the Tank Commander, and could request and control the fires as required. Also, tank fire was utilized to mark targets for air strikes. (RESTRICTED)

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WATER SUPPLY

Due to appreciable increase in heat and the difficulty of obtaining water on the high ground generally occupied in a tactical situation, it is recommended that each man in the rifle companies, plus some elements of the heavy weapons company, be issued two (2) canteens for summer use. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 38th FA Bn - 2d Inf Div

DATE: May 1951 Source No. 237

ON-POSITION FIRES

The Fire Direction Center prepared a comprehensive fire plan

calling for concentrations both ahead of and on friendly positions. The Infantry had foxholes with overhead cover for each man, the plan being to fire VT on friendly positions in case of enemy infiltration tactics. The large amount of work that this necessitated later paid great dividends for our troops, for the enemy was driven off our positions by VT fuzed artillery shells fired over friendly troops. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Engr C Bn

DATE: April 1951 Source No. 238

ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE

The Reconnaissance Section is continually out gathering engineer information. It would facilitate matters considerably if a "Land Polaroid" camera were added to that section's T/O&E. It would enable them to return from a reconnaissance with pictures of bridges needing repair, bad sections of road, etc. This would help in planning operations. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Engr C Bn - Staff Journal

DATE: April 1951 Source No. 239

TRAINING IN USE OF MINES

Since the area in which the Divisional elements were involved had been previously defended during the Eighth Army withdrawal, there were countless scattered minefields. Some of these had been properly recorded and were easily and quickly removed. The majority however, were small isolated groups or fields of mines, often booby-trapped and found only when friendly troops were injured within that area. Even with the aid of mine field reports the removal of the fields was made extremely difficult by the inaccuracies of the reports. More and better training is required for all ranks and branches if highest efficiency with minimum casualties to friendly troops is to be obtained. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Inf Div

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 240

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS T/O&E

Experience in operations in Korea has proved a definite requirement of additional officers in Division Headquarters, over and above those authorized in T/O&E 7-1N, to insure efficient, smooth and accurate functioning of the headquarters.

The T/O for the G-3 Section is:

G-3	Lt Col
Asst G-3	Major
I&E Off	Major
I&E Asst	Capt
G-3 Air	Major
Liaison Off	Capt
Liaison Off	Capt
Liaison Off	Capt

Except for the Assistant I&E Officer, all of the T/O positions are full time jobs which do not permit the use of these officers for any additional duty. When Psychological Warfare was transferred to G-3, with the requirement that an officer be put on full time duty in this assignment, the Assistant I&E Officer was deleted and the Psychological Warfare Officer was substituted in his place. Under the T/O&E, only the G-3 and assistant G-3 are available to actually operate as Plans and Operations personnel.

In order to adequately plan future operation, keep track of and inspect directed activities, conduct special projects such as task force operations, visit units to check operations and assure that all concepts of the Commanding General are carried out, and to provide qualified and trained replacements in the event of sudden loss of the G-3 or assistant G-3 it is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition of two (2) Majors, G-3 Plans, Inspections and Special Projects Officers.

The T/O for the G-2 Section is:

G-2	Lt Col
Asst G-2	Major
Asst G-2	Captain
Order of Battle	Captain
Photo Interpreter	Captain

Photo Interpreter	Lieutenant
Interrogator Prisoner	Captain
Interrogator Prisoner	Lieutenant
Interrogator Prisoner	Lieutenant
Interrogator Prisoner	Lieutenant

Comment: Interrogators are assigned when specifically authorized by Department of the Army (Section IIB, T/O 7-1N Nov 15 1950).

Although the Photo Interpreters and Prisoner Interrogators are, on occasion, available for additional duties, their primary duties so often require their full attention that they cannot be relied on to regularly devote their time to additional duties.

In order to produce positive intelligence information in this Theatre, several agencies not normally associated with the office of the ACOFS G-2, have been developed and are being exploited. The 3d CIC Detachment, which normally employs a limited number of native agents in its routine counterintelligence functions, has been developed into a positive as well as a counterintelligence agency, employing a large number of native linecrossers. EUSAK has attached a team of positive intelligence agents (TLO) to the Division. A ROKA Intelligence Platoon, containing an agent team, has been operating with the Division. Central control of these various agencies is essential to insure coordination with the tactical units for the movement of linecrossers, coordination with FSCC for artillery fire, and coordination among these agencies to prevent duplication. In addition, logistical support must be given these agencies. All of this adds up to a full time job for a company grade officer from the G-2 Section. Since the job is too important and too time consuming to be given to an officer as an additional duty, it is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition of a Captain or Lieutenant, G-2 Agent Control Officer.

In order to coordinate the intelligence functions of the Division Light Aviation Section and to insure that the maximum amount of intelligence information is obtained through the section, it is necessary that an officer from the G-2 Section remain at the Division airstrip at all times. This officer briefs pilots and observers on the current enemy situation and outlines sensitive areas for observation, debriefs pilots and observers upon completion of mission, schedules observation flights, makes frequent flights himself to

observe critical areas to note changes in enemy disposition and to check reports of other observers. All of the information thus secured is sent immediately to ACOFS, G-2. Since this is a full time job, it is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition of a Captain or Lieutenant, G-2 Air Officer.

The T/O for the G-4 Section is:

G-4	Lt Col
Asst G-4	Major
Asst G-4 Transportation	Major
Motor Officer	WO

The one transportation officer now authorized the Division advises the G-4 on transportation requirements of the Division, maintains a daily truck availability table, controls the allocation and operation of cargo vehicles within the Division, and prepares traffic circulation plans, including alternate routes and detours, in coordination with G-3, Division Engineer and Provost Marshal. On rail moves he maintains liaison with local RTOs regarding procurement of rail transportation, prepares transportation annexes for movement orders, and furnishes all units of the Division with the railroad requirements for loading, blocking and bracing. On water moves he coordinates with port authorities as to number and type of ships required, supervises the activities of unit embarkation officers, and coordinates with port authorities for movement of both equipment and personnel in both the outloading and unloading phases. He must coordinate with the Air Force on the air drop of supplies when necessitated by the tactical situation. On Division moves it is necessary that a transportation officer go forward with the advance echelon and that a representative remain at the rear until the move is completed. In view of the volume and variety of work required of the transportation officer, it is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition of a Captain, G-4 Motor Transportation Regulating Officer and Assistant Supply Officer, and a Captain, G-4 Passenger and Freight Transportation Officer and Assistant Supply Officer.

No provision is made in the T/O of an Infantry Division for a Post Exchange Officer, and only one officer, in the grade of Major, is allocated to the Special Service Section.

The Post Exchange System, as it operates in Korea, requires

the full time assignment of two (2) officers at the Division level. Supplies must be drawn at Pusan, signed for by an officer, moved to the Division by truck or rail, broken down to units for sale, and accounted for on a strict accountability basis. This system requires one officer continuously working between Division and Pusan, drawing and moving supplies, and another officer working at the Division PX point, controlling and allocating stocks, supervising sales, and maintaining accountability records. It is recommended that the T/O be augmented by the addition of a Captain and a Lieutenant, Post Exchange Officer. (SECRET)

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SNIPER FIRE

During the occupation of defensive positions, in order to inflict casualties on the enemy and to make the riverline untenable for him, sniper positions were prepared near the river bank in position to fire on enemy activity on the far shore. These positions were prepared at night and were well camouflaged. After completion, they were occupied prior to daylight and were vacated only after dark. The positions were most effective. Casualties were inflicted from them every day. To supplement these fires, platoons of the Tank Battalion and MR Battalion occupied hull defilade positions on the low hills near the river to snipe at appropriate targets across the river. These fires, together with the H&I fire of Division Artillery, made the enemy positions near the river so costly to maintain that they were virtually abandoned, even before the general withdrawal began. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)
Sec II: Supporting Documents
Book 11: Chemical

DATE: June 1951 Source No. 241

NAPALM MIXING

A napalm mixing team consisting of eight (8) enlisted members of this organization departed the company base 15 June and returned

to the company 23 June, after having mixed 43,000 gallons of napalm. (RESTRICTED)

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INSTALLATION OF MECHANIZED FLAME THROWERS

Four (4) mechanized flame throwers were installed in M4 tanks of the 7th Infantry Division by a team of five (5) enlisted men in two (2) working days. This installation included test firing of the flame throwers. (RESTRICTED)

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CHEMICAL CLASS V ITEMS

Experience in Korean operations has shown less Chemical Class V items are employed during an offensive than during a defensive operation. This is believed to be the reason for an overall 60% drop in issues from the EUSAK Advance Chemical Depot. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)
Book 3: ACOFS G-2

DATE: June 1951 Source No. 242

GUERRILLAS, ENEMY

The number of active guerrillas operating in friendly rear areas was estimated 7,500 on 25 June. Unless major reinforcements succeed in infiltrating friendly lines, it is believed that guerrilla strength will remain at approximately the same level indefinitely, losses being offset by local recruiting. Guerrilla activity during June was confined to raids on small towns and villages in isolated areas in search of food. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn Inf Regt - 1st Bn

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 243

	ACCURACY WITH GRENADES Our personnel used grenades, but were not too accurate with this weapon. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE:	Command Report - 36th Engr C Gp
DATE:	March 1951 SOURCE NO. 244
	INTERIOR MANAGEMENT Effective this month a report section has been established with the responsibility of coordinating all reports required by Group and by higher Headquarters. The large number of reports has made such a section necessary in order to keep subordinate units abreast of requirements and suspense dates. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE:	Report of US Army Aircraft Flying Accident from Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division to Commanding General EUSAK
DATE:	August 1951 Source No. 245
	HELICOPTER LANDING AND TAKE OFF FIELDS A combination of high altitude (1500 ft msl), high temperature (90°F), and no wind (under 10 mph) may make a normal helicopter landing and take off impossible. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE:	Command Report 2d Infantry Division
DATE:	May 1951 Source No. 246
	PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE A successful application of psychological warfare principles

was illustrated when an infantry regiment encountered an estimated 300 enemy in a road block. A division liaison plane effected a prearranged SCR 300 contact with the loudspeaker plane and with the Forward Air Controller. All ground fire was stopped while the Voice Plane broadcasted. The enemy was told that further resistance was hopeless, that the only alternative to destruction was surrender, and that surrender would be accepted if they would walk down the road toward the UN Forces. Several groups of enemy responded by walking down the road and surrendering. Other groups were seen moving north, apparently feeling that the promised lull would be a good time to effect an escape. In any event, there was no further resistance from that particular road block. After the time stipulated, a final message was broadcast to the effect that those who had not taken the opportunity to surrender would now be slain. The artillery immediately placed a heavy concentration on the road along which the enemy was retreating. The operation was successful, therefore, in convincing many of the Communists to surrender while, at the same time, lowering the will to fight of those who remained. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Inf Div - Appendix D - Operations

DATE: May 1951 Source No. 247

FOUGASSE

Units are urged to utilize fougasses in the organization of positions. Eight (8) dug-in improvised flame throwers (napalm thickened gasoline) already are installed covering the junction of two (2) valleys. These fougasses cover two (2) probable enemy avenues of approach to a portion of the Line manned by elements of an infantry battalion. Each fougasse will produce a mass of flame twenty-five (25) to forty (40) yards in range and one-third (1/3) that in width, similar in effect to a napalm bomb but on a reduced scale. Each is buried and sandbagged at a thrity degree (30°) angle from the horizontal, or is horizontal if the target is downhill, with the uncovered end facing the enemy approach avenue. A propelling, exploding, and igniting charge of 1½ to 2 pounds of block TNT (or equivalent explosive), two (2) M15 WP grenades (or one 81-mm mortar WP round) and a detonator either with or without

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blasting cord (primacord) is taped to the center of the barrel head which is buried. Activation will be either by remote control through manually operated electric detonation, or by a primacord lead from the nearest foxhole, thus assuring detonation when a lucrative target presents itself. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: May 1951 Source No 248

LESSONS LEARNED IN RETROGRADE MOVEMENT

Although an all-out attempt to recapture SEOUL by the enemy appeared imminent during the first days of May, railheads for divisions were retained in SEOUL, together with the ammunition at ammunition supply point 54. Bridges and switches were left intact. This was as a result of lessons learned on previous retrograde movements and subsequent advances.

As the United Nations counteroffensive progressed northwards, only minor repairs were required to place rail lines in operation once again. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 76th Engineer Const Bn

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 249

ADMINISTRATIVE OVERLOAD

The administrative reports required of the unit present a major problem. An example is the Command Report, of which this writing is a part, which consumed five hundred and sixty (560) pages, and is required monthly. (RESTRICTED)

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